Edinburgh Women in Philosophy Group - Talk by Jessica Wilson

Friday, August 15, 2014
Room 1.17 - Dugald Stewart Building
Event type: 

Jessica Wilson: "Are there indeterminate states of affairs?"

In 'A determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy' (Inquiry, 2013), I provided an account of metaphysical (as opposed to semantic or epistemic) indeterminacy, applying to vague boundaries, quantum indeterminacy, and the open future, as involving an object's having a determinable property but no unique determinate of that property. Here I contrast my account with the sort of 'metaphysical supervaluationist' account endorsed by Elizabeth Barnes and Robbie Williams, on which metaphysical indeterminacy consists, not in there being an indeterminate state of affairs, but in its being indeterminate which determinate state of affairs obtains.