Debates about mental entities have tended to assume that there are only two options concerning their ontological status: realism or eliminativism. Little, if any, discussion has been focused on a third option: that mental entities are fictional entities. According to this option, although not real, mental entities play such a useful role in theorising that talk of them should not be eliminated. Given the popularity of fictionalism in other domains it is surprising that fictionalism about mental entities has not received more attention. This conference will be used as a platform to build a network of like-minded researchers interested in mental fictionalism, and to further debates concerned with the ontological status of mental entities.
Dr Emily Caddick Bourne (Cambridge)
Prof Gregory Currie (York)
Dr Tamás Demeter (Phil. Institute Hungary)
Prof Dan Hutto (Wollongong)
Dr Ted Parent (Virginia)
Dr Meg Wallace (Kentucky)
Dr Adam Toon (Exeter)
Registration is free. To register please email Adrian Downey.